


801-6051 -5

5 NOV 1958



**MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence**

**SUBJECT : Proposed DCID to Establish a  
USIB Security Committee**

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation submitted for DCI approval. Such recommendation is contained in paragraph (11).

2. The publication of the 15 September 1958 revision of NSCID No. 1 (New Series) places certain responsibilities in the security field upon the DCI and the USIB. Since there is neither a committee within USIB nor a regularly constituted inter-Agency medium through which actions might be initiated, it appears necessary that a mechanism be established for this purpose.

3. In view of the increased emphasis upon the protection of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, it must be assumed that both the DCI and the USIB will review present directives and may initiate action for the further development of policies, procedures, and practices to provide the necessary safeguards for the protection of community intelligence.

4. The security responsibilities under NSCID No. 1 are as follows:

FOR THE USIB

- a. In Section 2 paragraph a (5) the USIB shall "Develop and review security standards and practices as they relate to the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

b. FOR THE MEMBER DEPARTMENTS  
AND AGENCIES

In Section (5), "Each department and agency, however, shall remain responsible for the

MOR/CDF Pages 1-8, 10-18,  
19-27, 30-37, 38-45.

protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods within its own organization. Each shall also establish appropriate internal policies and procedures to prevent the unauthorized disclosure from within that agency of intelligence information or activity".

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE

- c. In Section (5) "The Director of Central Intelligence, with the assistance and support of the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board, shall ensure the development of policies and procedures for the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure".

In addition to the above the Director has been given a special responsibility as follows: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall call upon the departments and agencies, as appropriate, to investigate within their department or agency any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence or of intelligence sources or methods. A report of these investigations, including corrective measures taken or recommended within the departments and agencies involved, shall be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for review and such further action as may be appropriate, including reports to the National Security Council or the President".

5. These responsibilities will require a continuing review of security practices and procedures by both the USIB and the member departments and agencies. In this regard Executive Order 10501, effective December 5, 1953, sets the minimum standards for the safeguarding of classified defense information and thus provides uniformity in the basic procedures among the departments and agencies of government. Most departments and agencies in the intelligence community have supplemented Executive Order 10501 with additional internal control procedures, particularly

where intelligence and special source material is involved. These supplemental controls have usually been instituted on the basis of security requirements peculiar to the department or agency concerned and not necessarily on the basis of a security problem common to the intelligence community.

6. There is no present authorized committee within the intelligence community to deal with security matters relating to the overall protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure and the development of uniformity where appropriate in security procedures. The IAC did not have a committee for security matters of this nature. The USCIB did have a special committee on Comint Personnel Security Standards but this committee has been inoperative for the past two years. There was also an established USCIB Security Committee (USCIB SECCOM) largely concerned with procedural matters, however, this committee, since the formation of USIB, has been inoperative and there is no security committee in USIB to which its functions can logically be assigned. NSCID No. 6 provides in conformity with Section (2) NSCID No. 1 that the USIB shall study standards and practices of the departments and agencies in protecting Comint; and determine the degree and type of security protection to be given ELINT activities.

Security directives carried over from the IAC and the USCIB which are currently in effect are DCID No. 11/1, Control of Initial Information Regarding Foreign Nuclear Explosions, DCID No. 11/2 Control of Dissemination and Use of Intelligence and Intelligence Information, and USCIB No. 5 Standards and Practices for Clearance of Personnel for Comint.

The continuous review of security directives and concern with overall security matters affecting the intelligence community must necessarily be provided for by the USIB to carry out its responsibilities.

7. In the past several years there have been serious unauthorized disclosures of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods. The investigations of these unauthorized disclosures have been carried out under difficult circumstances by the informal cooperative efforts of the security officers in the affected agencies and departments through their

normal security channels. The informality of this system has retarded the investigative function in that there was no established central coordinating point to channel the investigative activities and exchange timely investigative leads and information. The results of these investigations revealed several violations of existing security regulations but more importantly, revealed certain weaknesses in the security systems of the intelligence community in the dissemination and the handling of intelligence information. Certain corrective recommendations resulted from these investigations but there was no single committee or mechanism by which action on these corrective measures could be taken on an overall community basis.

8. It is felt that there are more unauthorized disclosures of information than is apparent to the intelligence community and some of these are accordingly never reported and investigated. The intricacies of the intelligence community structure with its specialized committees and special channels of information have aggravated this problem. The discovery of a possible unauthorized disclosure is frequently discerned by those intelligence officers dealing with substantive intelligence information who recognize their information in unauthorized hands. Often these suspicions are not immediately forwarded to the professional security officers who must take investigative action. The wide spread and timely exchange of information in the intelligence community makes it impossible to readily identify, in situations involving an unauthorized disclosure, those departments and agencies involved, as all have been recipients of the identical piece of intelligence information. In the absence of a system for the reporting of suspected violations on a community basis, much valuable time is lost from the investigative standpoint in determining the principal agencies involved and organizing the informal liaison contacts in order to pursue a mutual investigative effort. Lacking a clearly defined procedure on a community level, there is certain resultant confusion and duplication of effort. In circumstances where the violation is suspected but not evident and no department appears to have primary responsibility or interest, there is a natural hesitation in the intelligence community to suggest through liaison channels that the violation may have occurred in another department. Accordingly, inaction is likely to be the final result.

9. In view of the rapid developments in the intelligence complex and frequent adjustments in the organizational structure to meet these changes, the security practices and procedures to be effective must be kept under constant review. Weaknesses that are permitted to develop in the security system will sooner or later lead to unauthorized disclosures and the resultant investigations will generally reveal these weaknesses. Failure to eliminate the weaknesses on a community level will merely compound the security problems involved. The individual security officers of the member departments and agencies cannot solve these problems by unilateral action but should have a committee mechanism whereby the security officers can focalize their mutual problems and more effectively develop and coordinate corrective actions.

10. It is, therefore, proposed that a USIB committee composed of the responsible security officers of the member departments and agencies be established to act upon the security responsibilities established for USIB under NSCID No. 1 and to serve as a support mechanism when requested, to the Director of Central Intelligence in the exercise of his special responsibilities set forth in Section 5 of NSCID No. 1.

11. It is recommended that the attached proposed DCID be submitted to the USIB for approval.



Shepherd Edwards  
Director of Security

25X1

**Distribution:**

✓ Orig & 1 - DCI  
1 - DDCI  
1 - ER  
1 - DDP  
1 - DDI  
3 - DDS  
1 - DDC

**Attachment:**

Proposed DCID

**SECRET**

SECRET

CONCURRENCES:

[Redacted Signature Box]

Deputy Director(Plans)

19 Nov 58  
Date

25X1

[Redacted Signature Box]

Deputy Director (Intelligence)

13 JAN 1959  
Date

25X1

25X1

[Redacted Signature Box]

Deputy Director (Support)

7 Nov 58  
Date

25X1

[Redacted Signature Box]

Deputy Director(Coordination)

21 Jan 59  
Date

*APC*  
*DDCI Jan 59*

The recommendation contained in paragraph 11 is approved.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Director

*Proposed DCID as rewritten and approved by DCI on 31 Jan 59 being circulated for consideration to members of USIB by USIB Secretariat.*

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 111

Security Committee

Pursuant to Section 2, sub-paragraph a ( 5) and Section 5, NSCID No. 1 (New Series) revised 15 September 1958 and for the purpose of preventing unauthorized disclosure of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods, a standing committee of the USIB is hereby established.

1. Composition and Organization

The committee shall be known as the USIB Security Committee and shall include representatives of the USIB agencies. It is expected that the responsible security officers of the member departments and agencies of USIB will serve as the representatives on the committee. Other agencies of the government may be invited by the committee to participate as appropriate. The CIA member will chair the committee.

2. Mission

The mission of the committee shall be to promote means by which the intelligence community may prevent the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods.

3. Functions

a) To develop and review security standards, practices and procedures as they relate to the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, and to make recommendations thereon to the Board. The Committee shall coordinate closely with other Committees of the Board with related security responsibilities.

b) To assist, as requested, the Director of Central Intelligence in the exercise of his responsibilities pursuant to Section 5, NSCID No. 1.


c) To recommend security policy to the USIB as it pertains to the intelligence community. Such policy recommendations shall be consonant, however, with the responsibility of each department and agency for the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods within its own organization and

the establishment of appropriate internal policies and procedures to prevent the unauthorized disclosure from within that department and agency of intelligence information or activity.

d) The Committee shall make such other reports and recommendations to the <sup>Intelligence</sup> Board as may be appropriate or requested.

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28 January 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer, O/DCI


SUBJECT : Proposed USIB Security Committee

1. Attached is the memorandum from General Truscott to the Director, dated 21 January, and the memorandum to the Director from the Director of Security, dated 5 November 1958, attaching the proposed DCID on a security committee. I take an exceedingly dim view of the fact that this memorandum and the proposed directive have been circulating approximately three months and were never called to the attention of this office. Not only is the subject a matter of interest to this office, but it directly relates to our work. I recognize of course that the original fault is with the Office of Security for having prepared a concurrence sheet which called for the signatures of the four deputies but not the Inspector General. It is my opinion, based upon what the Director has said both internally and externally, that matters of a general nature such as this affecting the over-all work of the agency are properly within the purview of this office. Consequently I think the Inspector General's name should be included for concurrence. Further, I would point out that there have been several instances lately where matters of direct interest to this staff have only inadvertently come to my attention, and I would assume that there are other matters of interest which have failed to come to our attention.

2. As far as the substance of the proposal is concerned, I concur in the proposed directive and believe that it will not conflict with other established committees dealing with security matters as long as its charter is specifically restricted to section 5, NSCID-1. I also reiterate my oral suggestion made at the deputies meeting on 27 January that in presenting this to USIB the Director call to the attention of the Board the memorandum from Gordon Gray on the subject, dated 26 September 1958.

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*DCI noted and approved  
submission to USIB on  
31 Jan. 1959.*



Lyman B. Kirkpatrick  
Inspector General

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SECRET

21 January 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Proposed USIB Security Committee

1. This memorandum contains a suggested course of action with respect to tabling a proposed DCID at a future USIB meeting. This suggestion is contained in paragraph 2.


2. A succession of recent disclosures jeopardizing sources and methods clearly indicates a need for a security committee such as Edwards recommends in his memorandum attached hereto. Since there is no such committee in existence to propose such Terms of Reference, I suggest that the best procedure would be for you to table the proposed DCID at an early USIB meeting with an oral statement

(a) pointing out the lack of such a committee at the present time and emphasizing the important assistance such a committee might render;

(b) suggesting that the Board members and their staffs study the draft proposal;

(c) invite suggestions and indicate the availability of Shef Edwards and his staff and other CIA offices for consultation; and

(d) consideration for approval at a meeting about two weeks hence.

  
L. K. TRUSCOTT, JR.  
General, USA (Ret.)  
Deputy Director (Coordination)

25X1

cc: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Attachment

*concur*  
*CFC*  
*DDCI*  
*21 Jan 59*

DD/S  
59-0016

4-2687

OCF-6058 - 58

NOV 1958

Executive Registry
10-9016

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence**

**SUBJECT : Proposed DCID to Establish a  
USIB Security Committee**

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation submitted for DCI approval. Such recommendation is contained in paragraph (11).

2. The publication of the 15 September 1958 revision of NSCID No. 1 (New Series) places certain responsibilities in the security field upon the DCI and the USIB. Since there is neither a committee within USIB nor a regularly constituted inter-Agency medium through which actions might be initiated, it appears necessary that a mechanism be established for this purpose.

3. In view of the increased emphasis upon the protection of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, it must be assumed that both the DCI and the USIB will review present directives and may initiate action for the further development of policies, procedures, and practices to provide the necessary safeguards for the protection of community intelligence.

4. The security responsibilities under NSCID No. 1 are as follows:

**FOR THE USIB**

- a. In Section 2 paragraph a (5) the USIB shall "Develop and review security standards and practices as they relate to the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

**b. FOR THE MEMBER DEPARTMENTS  
AND AGENCIES**

In Section (5), "Each department and agency, however, shall remain responsible for the

protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods within its own organization. Each shall also establish appropriate internal policies and procedures to prevent the unauthorized disclosure from within that agency of intelligence information or activity".

**FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE**

- c. In Section (5) "The Director of Central Intelligence, with the assistance and support of the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board, shall ensure the development of policies and procedures for the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure".

In addition to the above the Director has been given a special responsibility as follows: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall call upon the departments and agencies, as appropriate, to investigate within their department or agency any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence or of intelligence sources or methods. A report of these investigations, including corrective measures taken or recommended within the departments and agencies involved, shall be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for review and such further action as may be appropriate, including reports to the National Security Council or the President".

5. These responsibilities will require a continuing review of security practices and procedures by both the USIB and the member departments and agencies. In this regard Executive Order 10501, effective December 5, 1953, sets the minimum standards for the safeguarding of classified defense information and thus provides uniformity in the basic procedures among the departments and agencies of government. Most departments and agencies in the intelligence community have supplemented Executive Order 10501 with additional internal control procedures, particularly

where intelligence and special source material is involved. These supplemental controls have usually been instituted on the basis of security requirements peculiar to the department or agency concerned and not necessarily on the basis of a security problem common to the intelligence community.

6. There is no present authorized committee within the intelligence community to deal with security matters relating to the overall protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure and the development of uniformity where appropriate in security procedures. The IAC did not have a committee for security matters of this nature. The USCIB did have a special committee on Comint Personnel Security Standards but this committee has been inoperative for the past two years. There was also an established USCIB Security Committee (USCIB SECCOM) largely concerned with procedural matters, however, this committee, since the formation of USIB, has been inoperative and there is no security committee in USIB to which its functions can logically be assigned. NSCID No. 6 provides in conformity with Section (2) NSCID No. 1 that the USIB shall study standards and practices of the departments and agencies in protecting Comint; and determine the degree and type of security protection to be given ELINT activities.

Security directives carried over from the IAC and the USCIB which are currently in effect are DCID No. 11/1, Control of Initial Information Regarding Foreign Nuclear Explosions, DCID No. 11/2 Control of Dissemination and Use of Intelligence and Intelligence Information, and USCIB No. 5 Standards and Practices for Clearance of Personnel for Comint.

The continuous review of security directives and concern with overall security matters affecting the intelligence community must necessarily be provided for by the USIB to carry out its responsibilities.

7. In the past several years there have been serious unauthorized disclosures of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods. The investigations of these unauthorized disclosures have been carried out under difficult circumstances by the informal cooperative efforts of the security officers in the affected agencies and departments through their

normal security channels. The informality of this system has retarded the investigative function in that there was no established central coordinating point to channel the investigative activities and exchange timely investigative leads and information. The results of these investigations revealed several violations of existing security regulations but more importantly, revealed certain weaknesses in the security systems of the intelligence community in the dissemination and the handling of intelligence information. Certain corrective recommendations resulted from these investigations but there was no single committee or mechanism by which action on these corrective measures could be taken on an over-all community basis.

8. It is felt that there are more unauthorized disclosures of information than is apparent to the intelligence community and some of these are accordingly never reported and investigated. The intricacies of the intelligence community structure with its specialized committees and special channels of information have aggravated this problem. The discovery of a possible unauthorized disclosure is frequently discerned by those intelligence officers dealing with substantive intelligence information who recognize their information in unauthorized hands. Often these suspicions are not immediately forwarded to the professional security officers who must take investigative action. The wide spread and timely exchange of information in the intelligence community makes it impossible to readily identify, in situations involving an unauthorized disclosure, those departments and agencies involved, as all have been recipients of the identical piece of intelligence information. In the absence of a system for the reporting of suspected violations on a community basis, much valuable time is lost from the investigative standpoint in determining the principal agencies involved and organizing the informal liaison contacts in order to pursue a mutual investigative effort. Lacking a clearly defined procedure on a community level, there is certain resultant confusion and duplication of effort. In circumstances where the violation is suspected but not evident and no department appears to have primary responsibility or interest, there is a natural hesitation in the intelligence community to suggest through liaison channels that the violation may have occurred in another department. Accordingly, inaction is likely to be the final result.

9. In view of the rapid developments in the intelligence complex and frequent adjustments in the organizational structure to meet these changes, the security practices and procedures to be effective must be kept under constant review. Weaknesses that are permitted to develop in the security system will sooner or later lead to unauthorized disclosures and the resultant investigations will generally reveal these weaknesses. Failure to eliminate the weaknesses on a community level will merely compound the security problems involved. The individual security officers of the member departments and agencies cannot solve these problems by unilateral action but should have a committee mechanism whereby the security officers can focalize their mutual problems and more effectively develop and coordinate corrective actions.

10. It is, therefore, proposed that a USIB committee composed of the responsible security officers of the member departments and agencies be established to act upon the security responsibilities established for USIB under NSCID No. 1 and to serve as a support mechanism when requested, to the Director of Central Intelligence in the exercise of his special responsibilities set forth in Section 5 of NSCID No. 1.

11. It is recommended that the attached proposed DCID be submitted to the USIB for approval.

Sheffield Edwards  
Director of Security

**Distribution:**

Orig & 1 - DCI  
1 - DDCI  
1 - ER  
1 - DDP  
✓ 1 - DDI  
3 - DDS  
1 - DDC

**Attachment:**

Proposed DCID

CONCURRENCES:

(Signed) Richard Helms

19 NOV 1958

*A/* Deputy Director (Plans)

Date

ILLEGIB

[Redacted]

15 JAN 1959

Deputy Director (Intelligence)

Date

*/s/*  
Deputy Director (Support)

7 NOV 1958

Date

[Redacted]

25X1

*/s/*  
Deputy Director (Coordination)

Date

*21 Jan 1959*

*15/0 P.C.  
DDC  
21 Jan 59*

The recommendation contained in paragraph 11 is approved.

Date

Director

*Proposed DCID as rewritten, and approved by D.C.I. on 3 Jan 59  
being circulated for consideration to members of U.S.I.B. by  
U.S.I.B. Secretariat.*



**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO.**

**Security Committee**

Pursuant to Section 2, sub-paragraph a ( 5) and Section 5, NSCID No. 1 (New Series) revised 15 September 1958 and for the purpose of preventing unauthorized disclosure of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods, a standing committee of the USIB is hereby established.

**1. Composition and Organization**

The committee shall be known as the USIB Security Committee and shall include representatives of the USIB agencies. It is expected that the responsible security officers of the member departments and agencies of USIB will serve as the representatives on the committee. Other agencies of the government may be invited by the committee to participate as appropriate. The CIA member will chair the committee.

**2. Mission**

The mission of the committee shall be to promote means by which the intelligence community may prevent the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods.

**3. Functions**

a) To develop and review security standards, practices and procedures as they relate to the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, and to make recommendations thereon to the Board. The Committee shall coordinate closely with other Committees of the Board with related security responsibilities.


b) To assist, as requested, the Director of Central Intelligence in the exercise of his responsibilities pursuant to Section 5, NSCID No. 1.

c) To recommend security policy to the USIB as it pertains to the intelligence community. Such policy recommendations shall be consonant, however, with the responsibility of each department and agency for the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods within its own organization and

**the establishment of appropriate internal policies and procedures to prevent the unauthorized disclosure from within that department and agency of intelligence information or activity.**

**d) The Committee shall make such other reports and recommendations to the Board as may be appropriate or requested.**

21 January 1959



MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Proposed USIB Security Committee

1. This memorandum contains a suggested course of action with respect to tabling a proposed DCID at a future USIB meeting. This suggestion is contained in paragraph 2.

2. A succession of recent disclosures jeopardizing sources and methods clearly indicates a need for a security committee such as Edwards recommends in his memorandum attached hereto. Since there is no such committee in existence to propose such Terms of Reference, I suggest that the best procedure would be for you to table the proposed DCID at an early USIB meeting with an oral statement

(a) pointing out the lack of such a committee at the present time and emphasizing the important assistance such a committee might render;

(b) suggesting that the Board members and their staffs study the draft proposal;

(c) invite suggestions and indicate the availability of Chief Edwards and his staff and other CIA offices for consultation; and

(d) consideration for approval at a meeting about two weeks hence.

L. K. FANCOFF, JR.  
General, USA (Ret.)  
Deputy Director (Coordination)


cc: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Attachment

Distribution:

- 0 & 1 - Addce
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - Dir/Security via DD/S
- 1 - ER
- 1 - Fancoast
- 1 - LKT chrono

*Concurrence*  
*12/10/59*  
*DDCI*  
*21 Jan 59*



5 NOV 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Proposed DCIE to Establish a  
USIB Security Committee

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation submitted for DCI approval. Such recommendation is contained in paragraph (1).

2. The publication of the 15 September 1958 revision of NSCID No. 1 (New Series) places certain responsibilities in the security field upon the DCI and the USIB. Since there is neither a committee within USIB nor a regularly constituted inter-Agency medium through which actions might be initiated, it appears necessary that a mechanism be established for this purpose.

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methods from unauthorized disclosure.

b. FOR THE MEMBER DEPARTMENTS  
AND AGENCIES

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however, shall remain responsible for the

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**FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE**

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**SECRET**

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11. It is recommended that the attached proposed DCID be submitted to the USIB for approval.

SIGNED

Sheffield Edwards  
Director of Security

**Distribution:**

Orig & 1 - DCI  
1 - DDCI  
1 - ER  
1 - DDP  
1 - DDI  
3 - DDS  
1 - DDC

**Attachment:**

Proposed DCID

**SECRET**



**SECRET**

**CONCURRENCES:**

(Signed) Richard Helms

10 NOV 1958

**Deputy Director (Plans)**

Date

ILLEGIB

[Redacted]

19 Jan 59

**Deputy Director (Intelligence)**

Date

25X1

[Redacted]

**Deputy Director (Support)**

Date

1 Nov. 58

25X1

[Redacted]

**Deputy Director (Coordination)**

Date

21 Jan 1959

ISI (DPC)  
DDCI  
21 Jan 1959

The recommendation contained in paragraph 11 is approved.

Date

**Director**

(Proposed DCID as rewritten and approved by DCI on 31 Jan 1959 being circulated for consideration to members of USIB by USIB Secretariat.

**SECRET**

**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO.**

**Security Committee**

Pursuant to Section 2, sub-paragraph a (5) and Section 5, NSCID No. 1 (New Series) revised 15 September 1958 and for the purpose of preventing unauthorized disclosure of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods, a standing committee of the USIB is hereby established.

**1. Composition and Organization**

The committee shall be known as the USIB Security Committee and shall include representatives of the USIB agencies. It is expected that the responsible security officers of the member departments and agencies of USIB will serve as the representatives on the committee. Other agencies of the government may be invited by the committee to participate as appropriate. The CIA member will chair the committee.

**2. Mission**

The mission of the committee shall be to promote means by which the intelligence community may prevent the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods.

**3. Functions**

a) To develop and review security standards, practices and procedures as they relate to the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, and to make recommendations thereon to the Board. The Committee shall coordinate closely with other Committees of the Board with related security responsibilities.

b) To assist, as requested, the Director of Central Intelligence in the exercise of his responsibilities pursuant to Section 5, NSCID No. 1.

c) To recommend security policy to the USIB as it pertains to the intelligence community. Such policy recommendations shall be consonant, however, with the responsibility of each department and agency for the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods within its own organization and

**the establishment of appropriate internal policies and procedures to prevent the unauthorized disclosure from within that department and agency of intelligence information or activity.**

**d) The Committee shall make such other reports and recommendations to the Board as may be appropriate or requested.**

Executive Request

10-9016/2

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence**

**SUBJECT: Proposal by Director of Security, CIA, to  
Establish a USIB Security Committee**

1. It is recommended that the proposed DCID be amended as follows:

**Par. 2, Mission: Reword to read:**

"The mission of the committee shall be to formulate and recommend to USIB measures for the prevention of the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods. Excepted, however, are the fields of Atomic Energy Restricted Data and Communications Intelligence."


2. The reasons for the proposed change are:

a. The Atomic Energy Commission is by law responsible for the control and dissemination of Restricted Data under appropriate safeguards established by that Commission.

b. USIB has properly assigned COMINT Security under NSCID 6 to the COMINT Committee.

**HUNTINGTON D. SHELDON**  
**Acting Deputy Director, Intelligence**

*H. D. Sheldon*



17 December 1958

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Special Intelligence Staff**

**SUBJECT : Proposal by Director of Security, CIA  
to Establish a USIB Security Committee**

1. Reference is made to your note of 11 December 1958 concerning the rewording of Paragraph 2, (Mission) of the proposed DCID. In light of the exception that you wish to place on the Committee mission and responsibilities, it is felt that your ideas could be put in other words and provide, at the same time, for the USIB, in its discretion, to assign security problems in the future as may be appropriate.

2. Accordingly, it is proposed that under Paragraph 3, Functions, that a new sub-paragraph (d) be added to read as follows:

"The Committee will not concern itself with those matters of a security nature assigned to other committees of the USIB, except as may be directed from time to time by the USIB."

Sub-paragraph (d) of Paragraph 3, Functions, as presently written would consequently become sub-paragraph (e).


3. This office proposes to request a meeting of the DDI and DDC in the next few days for the consideration of this problem with a viewpoint of presenting a proposal agreed upon by all components of the Agency.

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Deputy Director of Security

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*Security*

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5 NOV 1958

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence****SUBJECT : Proposed DCID to Establish a  
USIB Security Committee**

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation submitted for DCI approval. Such recommendation is contained in paragraph (1).

2. The publication of the 15 September 1958 revision of NSCID No. 1 (New Series) places certain responsibilities in the security field upon the DCI and the USIB. Since there is neither a committee within USIB nor a regularly constituted inter-Agency medium through which actions might be initiated, it appears necessary that a mechanism be established for this purpose.

3. In view of the increased emphasis upon the protection of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, it must be assumed that both the DCI and the USIB will review present directives and may initiate action for the further development of policies, procedures, and practices to provide the necessary safeguards for the protection of community intelligence.

4. The security responsibilities under NSCID No. 1 are as follows:

FOR THE USIB

- a. In Section 2 paragraph a (5) the USIB shall "Develop and review security standards and practices as they relate to the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

b. FOR THE MEMBER DEPARTMENTS  
AND AGENCIES

In Section (5). Each department and agency, however, shall remain responsible for the

**protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods within its own organization. Each shall also establish appropriate internal policies and procedures to prevent the unauthorized disclosure from within that agency of intelligence information or activity".**

**FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE**

- c. In Section (5) The Director of Central Intelligence, with the assistance and support of the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board, shall ensure the development of policies and procedures for the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure .**

**In addition to the above the Director has been given a special responsibility as follows: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall call upon the departments and agencies, as appropriate, to investigate within their department or agency any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence or of intelligence sources or methods. A report of these investigations, including corrective measures taken or recommended within the departments and agencies involved, shall be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for review and such further action as may be appropriate, including reports to the National Security Council or the President".**

**5. These responsibilities will require a continuing review of security practices and procedures by both the USIB and the member departments and agencies. In this regard Executive Order 10501, effective December 5, 1953, sets the minimum standards for the safeguarding of classified defense information and thus provides uniformity in the basic procedure among the departments and agencies of government. Most departments and agencies in the intelligence community have supplemented Executive Order 10501 with additional internal control procedures, particularly**

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where intelligence and special source material is involved. These supplemental controls have usually been instituted on the basis of security requirements peculiar to the department or agency concerned and not necessarily on the basis of a security problem common to the intelligence community.

6. There is no present authorized committee within the intelligence community to deal with security matters relating to the overall protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure and the development of uniformity where appropriate in security procedures. The IAC did not have a committee for security matters of this nature. The USCIB did have a special committee on Comint Personnel Security Standards but this committee has been inoperative for the past two years. There was also an established USCIB Security Committee (USCIB SEC COM) largely concerned with procedural matters, however, this committee, since the formation of USIB, has been inoperative and there is no security committee in USIB to which its functions can logically be assigned. NSCID No. 6 provides in conformity with Section (2) NSCID No. 1 that the USIB shall study standards and practices of the departments and agencies in protecting Comint; and determine the degree and type of security protection to be given ELINT activities.

Security directives carried over from the IAC and the USCIB which are currently in effect are DCID No. 11/1, Control of Initial Information Regarding Foreign Nuclear Explosions, DCID No. 11/2 Control of Dissemination and Use of Intelligence and Intelligence Information, and USCIB No. 5 Standards and Practices for Clearance of Personnel for Comint.

The continuous review of security directives and concern with overall security matters affecting the intelligence community must necessarily be provided for by the USIB to carry out its responsibilities.

7. In the past several years there have been serious unauthorized disclosures of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods. The investigations of these unauthorized disclosures have been carried out under difficult circumstances by the informal cooperative efforts of the security officers in the affected agencies and departments through their

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normal security channels. The informality of this system has retarded the investigative function in that there was no established central coordinating point to channel the investigative activities and exchange timely investigative leads and information. The results of these investigations revealed several violations of existing security regulations but more importantly, revealed certain weaknesses in the security systems of the intelligence community in the dissemination and the handling of intelligence information. Certain corrective recommendations resulted from these investigations but there was no single committee or mechanism by which action on these corrective measures could be taken on an overall community basis.

6. It is felt that there are more unauthorized disclosures of information than is apparent to the intelligence community and some of these are accordingly never reported and investigated. The intricacies of the intelligence community structure with its specialized committees and special channels of information have aggravated this problem. The discovery of a possible unauthorized disclosure is frequently discerned by those intelligence officers dealing with substantive intelligence information who recognize their information in unauthorized hands. Often these suspicions are not immediately forwarded to the professional security officers who must take investigative action. The wide spread and timely exchange of information in the intelligence community makes it impossible to readily identify, in situations involving an unauthorized disclosure, those departments and agencies involved, as all have been recipients of the identical piece of intelligence information. In the absence of a system for the reporting of suspected violations on a community basis, much valuable time is lost from the investigative standpoint in determining the principal agencies involved and organizing the informal liaison contacts in order to pursue a mutual investigative effort. Lacking a clearly defined procedure on a community level, there is certain resultant confusion and duplication of effort. In circumstances where the violation is suspected but not evident and no department appears to have primary responsibility or interest, there is a natural hesitation in the intelligence community to suggest through liaison channels that the violation may have occurred in another department. Accordingly, inaction is likely to be the final result.

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9. In view of the rapid developments in the intelligence complex and frequent adjustments in the organizational structure to meet these changes, the security practices and procedures to be effective must be kept under constant review. Weaknesses that are permitted to develop in the security system will sooner or later lead to unauthorized disclosures and the resultant investigations will generally reveal these weaknesses. Failure to eliminate the weaknesses on a community level will merely compound the security problems involved. The individual security officers of the member departments and agencies cannot solve these problems by unilateral action but should have a committee mechanism whereby the security officers can focalize their mutual problems and more effectively develop and coordinate corrective actions.

10. It is, therefore, proposed that a USIB committee composed of the responsible security officers of the member departments and agencies be established to act upon the security responsibilities established for USIB under NSCID No. 1 and to serve as a support mechanism when requested, to the Director of Central Intelligence in the exercise of his special responsibilities set forth in Section 5 of NSCID No. 1.

11. It is recommended that the attached proposed DCID be submitted to the USIB for approval.

SIGNED

Sheffield Edwards  
Director of Security

**Distribution:**

Orig & 1 - DCI  
1 - DDCI  
1 - KR  
1 - DDP  
1 - DBI  
3 - DDS  
1 - DDC

**Attachment:**

Proposed DCID

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**CONCURRENCES:**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Deputy Director(Plans)**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Date**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Deputy Director (Intelligence)**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Date**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Deputy Director (Support)**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Date**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Deputy Director(Coordination)**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Date**

**The recommendation contained in paragraph 11 is approved.**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Date**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Director**

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**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO.**

**Security Committee**

Pursuant to Section 2, sub-paragraph a (3) and Section 5, NSCID No. 1 (New Series) revised 15 September 1956 and for the purpose of preventing unauthorized disclosure of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods, a standing committee of the USIB is hereby established.

**1. Composition and Organization**

The committee shall be known as the USIB Security Committee and shall include representatives of the USIB agencies. It is expected that the responsible security officers of the member departments and agencies of USIB will serve as the representatives on the committee. Other agencies of the government may be invited by the committee to participate as appropriate. The CIA member will chair the committee.

**2. Mission**

The mission of the committee shall be to promote means by which the intelligence community may prevent the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods.

**3. Functions**

a) To develop and review security standards, practices and procedures as they relate to the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure,

b) To assist, as requested, the Director of Central Intelligence in the exercise of his responsibilities pursuant to Section 5, NSCID No. 1,

c) To recommend security policy to the USIB as it pertains to the intelligence community. Such policy recommendations shall be consonant, however, with the responsibility of each department and agency for the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods within its own organization and

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**the establishment of appropriate internal policies and procedures to prevent the unauthorized disclosure from within that department and agency of intelligence information or activity.**

*section 1 - 101200000*  
**d) The committee shall make reports to the USIB as may be appropriate or requested.**

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OCI-6058-58

NOV 1958

Executive Registry

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**MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence**

**SUBJECT : Proposed DCID to Establish a  
USIB Security Committee**

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation submitted for DCI approval. Such recommendation is contained in paragraph (11).

2. The publication of the 15 September 1958 revision of NSCID No. 1 (New Series) places certain responsibilities in the security field upon the DCI and the USIB. Since there is neither a committee within USIB nor a regularly constituted inter-Agency medium through which actions might be initiated, it appears necessary that a mechanism be established for this purpose.

3. In view of the increased emphasis upon the protection of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, it must be assumed that both the DCI and the USIB will review present directives and may initiate action for the further development of policies, procedures, and practices to provide the necessary safeguards for the protection of community intelligence.

4. The security responsibilities under NSCID No. 1 are as follows:

FOR THE USIB

- a. In Section 2 paragraph a (5) the USIB shall "Develop and review security standards and practices as they relate to the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

b. FOR THE MEMBER DEPARTMENTS  
AND AGENCIES

In Section (5), "Each department and agency, however, shall remain responsible for the

protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods within its own organization. Each shall also establish appropriate internal policies and procedures to prevent the unauthorized disclosure from within that agency of intelligence information or activity".

**FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE**

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- c. In Section (5) "The Director of Central Intelligence, with the assistance and support of the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board, shall ensure the development of policies and procedures for the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure".

In addition to the above the Director has been given a special responsibility as follows: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall call upon the departments and agencies, as appropriate, to investigate within their department or agency any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence or of intelligence sources or methods. A report of these investigations, including corrective measures taken or recommended within the departments and agencies involved, shall be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for review and such further action as may be appropriate, including reports to the National Security Council or the President".

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**SECRET**

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11. It is recommended that the attached proposed DCID be submitted to the USIB for approval.

Sheffield Edwards  
Director of Security

**Distribution:**

Orig & 1 - DCI  
1 - DDCI  
1 - ER  
1 - DDP  
1 - DDI  
3 - DDS  
1 - DDC

**Attachment:**

Proposed DCID

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**CONCURRENCES:**

(Signed) Richard Helms	19 NOV 1958
<u>4/ Deputy Director (Plans)</u>	<u>Date</u>
<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 40px; width: 100%;"></div>	ILLEGIB
<u>Deputy Director (Intelligence) 6/1</u>	<u>Date</u>
<u>13/ Deputy Director (Support)</u>	7 NOV 1958
	<u>Date</u>
<u>Deputy Director (Coordination)</u>	<u>Date</u>

The recommendation contained in paragraph 11 is approved, \_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Director

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**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO.**

**Security Committee**

Pursuant to Section 2, sub-paragraph a (5) and Section 5, NSCID No. 1 (New Series) revised 15 September 1958 and for the purpose of preventing unauthorized disclosure of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods, a standing committee of the USIB is hereby established.

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**3. Functions**

a) To develop and review security standards, practices and procedures as they relate to the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

b) To assist, as requested, the Director of Central Intelligence in the exercise of his responsibilities pursuant to Section 5, NSCID No. 1.

c) To recommend security policy to the USIB as it pertains to the intelligence community. Such policy recommendations shall be consonant, however, with the responsibility of each department and agency for the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods within its own organization and

**the establishment of appropriate internal policies and procedures to prevent the unauthorized disclosure from within that department and agency of intelligence information or activity.**

**d) The committee shall make reports to the USIB as may be appropriate or requested.**

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